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"BACK-DOOR" RECAPTURE OF DEPRECIATION IN YEAR OF
SALE HELD IMPROPER
Occidental Loan Co. v. United States
235 F. Supp. 519 (S.D. Cal. 1964)
Plaintiff taxpayer owned two subsidiaries, which were liquidated in
1958. Plaintiff acquired all the subsidiary's assets, including a parcel of
land with residential rental units built thereon. The rental units cost
1,049,267.44 dollars, and were constructed and completed during the period
between August and November 1957. Using the sum-of-the-years digits
method over a twenty-five year term with no salvage value, plaintiff
properly computed depreciation on the rental units. Plaintiff correctly
deducted a total of 171,531.64 dollars from August 1957, to December 31,
1959. As of January 1, 1960, the adjusted basis of the land and improve-
ments was 1,054,073.33 dollars. In September of that year plaintiff sold the
property for 1,570,371.77 dollars, of which 877,735.80 dollars was attrib-
utable to depreciable improvements. Plaintiff took a deduction 49,191.44
dollars for depreciation on his federal income tax return, covering the
period January 1 to September 12, 1960, the date of sale, applying the
same method previously used. The Service took the view that, where
property is sold for an amount exceeding the adjusted basis on the first
day of the year, no depreciation shall be allowed for the year of sale. This
policy was based on the apparent belief that it is per se wrong for taxpayers
to make a profit, i.e., receive capital gains treatment as a result of the
depreciation deduction. The deduction was disallowed by the Commissioner,
and plaintiff was assessed 27, 979.60 dollars in additional taxes and interest
on the increased ordinary income. The plaintiff paid under protest and
brought this action to recover the amount of the assessment. The district
court allowed the refund in a well-reasoned opinion and in so doing, aligned
itself with three other district courts,' and the Tax Court.2 The Service's
position parallels only the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.3
What the district courts and the Tax Court have based their opinions
upon is not so much the merit of the taxpayer's case, but rather the utter
lack of saving grace for the Service's position. Most would agree that it is
not the purpose of the depreciation deduction to permit taxpayers the
1 Wyoming Builders, Inc., v. United States, 227 F. Supp. 534 (D. Wyo. 1964);
S & A Co. v. United States, 218 F. Supp. 677 (D. Minn. 1963); Kimball Gas
Prods. Co. v. United States, 12 Am. Fed. Tax R2d 5105 (W.D. Tex. 1962).
2 The Tax Court as recently as 1962 considered the problem involved here. The
case was Randolph D. Rouse, 39 T.C. 70 (1962), where the court decided against the
taxpayer, citing Cohn v. United States, 259 F.2d 371 (6th Cir. 1958). Then in 1964,
the Tax Court reversed itself in Macabe Co., 42 T.C. 87 (1964), and C. L. Nichols,
43 T.C. 14 (1964).
3 Fribourg Nay. Co. v. Commissioner, 335 F2d 15 (2d Cir. 1964); United
States v. Motorlease Corp. 334 F.2d 617 (2d Cir. 1964).
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favored capital gains treatment for what would otherwise be ordinary
income. The majority of the courts have rejected the Government's argu-
ment to justify the disallowance 4 despite the presumption of correctness
normally accorded the Commissioner's redeterminations. The courts have
sensed that something was wrong with the Service's position, but until the
Tax Court articulated the flaws in that position in Macabe,5 the opinions
were not entirely successful in explaining the dissatisfaction. Generally,
the Government's flaw is in its reliance upon hindsight to show that the
taxpayer has miscalculated depreciation for the year involved.
To state the obvious, it is clear that depreciable material assets wear
out, but the extent of wear varies widely within the class. Beginning with
cost minus a reasonable allowance for salvage, Congress has allowed a
deduction for depreciation of certain business assets to be taken over each
asset's estimated useful life.6 Adjusted cost is denominated adjusted basis. 7
In a period of generally rising prices, cost is the most conservative figure
reasonably allowable as a depreciable base.
For income tax purposes, the statute and implementing regulations 8
call for property to be depreciated by setting aside an amount each taxable
year following a reasonably consistent plan. The aggregate amounts so set
aside plus salvage value will, at the end of the estimated useful life, equal
the basis of the property. But only by coincidence will the salvage value
equal market value at the end of the assets' actual useful life. The reason-
able useful life of property for tax depreciation purposes can only be
developed and ascertained upon facts and information gained from past
4 Supra notes 1-3.
5 Macabe Co., supra note 2.
6 See generally Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 167.
7 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1012.
8 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-i (1964):
(a) Section 167(a) provides that a reasonable allowance for the exhaustion,
wear and tear, and obsolescence of property used in the trade or business or of
property held by the taxpayer for the production of income shall be allowed as a
depreciation deduction. The allowance is that amount which should be set aside for
the taxable year in accordance with a reasonably consistent plan (not necessarily
at a uniform rate), so that the aggregate of the amounts set aside, plus the salvage
value, will, at the end of the estimated useful life of the depreciable property, equal
the cost or other basis .... The allowance shall not reflect amounts representing a
mere reduction in market value....
(b) . . . the estimated useful life of an asset is not necessarily the useful life
inherent in the asset but is the period over which the asset may reasonably be expected
to be useful to the taxpayer in his trade or business. . . . This period shall be deter-
mined by reference to his experience with similar property taking into account present
conditions and probable future developments. . . . The estimated remaining useful
life may be subject to modification by reason of conditions known to exist at the end
of the taxable year and shall be redetermined when necessary regardless of the
method of computing depreciation. However, estimated remaining useful life shall
be redetermined only when the change in the useful life is significant and there is a
clear and convincing basis for the redetermination.
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experience in business. 9 The taxpayer should also estimate the reasonable
salvage value on the basis of past experience. The result is that both of
these steps must be taken prospectively. If the taxpayer's estimates are
reasonable, he has complied with the standards of the regulations, and
should be entitled to the deduction so long as he holds the asset and no
clear and convincing evidence for a redetermination exists.' 0 What consti-
tutes a miscalculation subject to redetermination? This can be answered
in part by stating what is not a miscalculation. The regulations provide
that gains resulting from changes in market value do not permit redeter-
mination of salvage value.1" The court felt in the instant case that the
government was obliged to disprove the plaintiff's claim that his gain was
due to a change in market price. The court said:
However, when the taxpayer sells his asset at an earlier time, for
some reason which could not have been foreseen, that act in and
of itself is not enough to cause a change in the estimates .... The
mere fact of sale at an amount higher than the adjusted basis does
not, ipso facto, prove that the estimates were incorrect, so there
is no reason to readjust them and disallow depreciation in year
of sale.1
2
The court suggests that evidence of resale price is not enough, but
that the government actually bear a burden of disproof. Stated another
way, the passage above quoted suggests that there is emerging a rebuttable
presumption that all such gains are due to changes in market value, and
under the regulations do not support a redetermination.
The Tax Court has taken a similar view. In Macabe,13 the taxpayer
corporation unexpectedly disposed of a building substantially before the
end of its estimated useful life. The Service disallowed depreciation in
the year of sale since sale proceeds exceeded depreciated basis. The Tax
Court reversed the Service, expressly rejecting the Second Circuit cases.14
Actual sale price, according to the Tax Court, bears little if any relevance
to the property's salvage value. Concepts of depreciation through exhaus-
tion, and appreciation or depredation due to market conditions cannot be
equated. Salvage value, held the Macabe court, is totally different from the
amount received upon the sale of an asset, except when the asset is sold at
or near the end of its useful life. The court further stated that salvage
proceeds and actual duration of use of depreciable property may be used to
correct a depreciable base only when a miscalculation has been made. The
9 Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. United States, 223 F. Supp. 111 (D. Ore. 1963);
Treas. Reg. § 1.167 (a)-1(b) (1964).
10 See Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-1 (b) (1964).
11 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-1(a) (1964).
12 Occidental Loan Co. v. United States, 235 F. Supp. 519, 523 (S.D. Cal. 1964).
(Emphasis added.)
13 Macabe Co., supra note 2.
14 Supra note 3.
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Service has made no determination that the original estimate of useful life
or salvage value was inaccurate according to the court.
The court in the instant case also felt that the Government had failed
to provide a basis for disallowance of depreciation in the year of sale. The
court felt that the Service had been untrue to its own dictates, both in the
regulations 15 and in Revenue Ruling 62-92.16 Although both require clear
and convincing evidence to redetermine the depreciation basis, the revenue
ruling expressly follows the Cohn rule disallowing year-end depreciation
if the sale price exceeds the basis at the beginning of the tax year.
The Service's policy as expressed in Revenue Ruling 53-9017 and
quoted with approval in Revenue Ruling 62-9218 is generally not to disturb
depreciation deductions [except in the face of a clear and convincing basis
to effectuate] its principal purpose of reducing controversies with respect
to depreciation. The court intimated that the Service was not hewing faith-
fully to its announced policy by redetermining depreciation without clear
and convincing evidence. In the instant case, the increased sale price has
not been shown to result from causes beyond market value and the regula-
tions specifically deny the Service the right to redetermine on that basis.19
The Cohn rule has been criticised as a mistaken interpretation of an
incorrect case.20 The writers seem to assume that proving Cohn wrong
brings down Revenue Ruling 62-92. Not so. The Commissioner is bound
only by Supreme Court decisions, and these he may distinguish. The point
remains that simple fairness and the large sums at stake dictate some form
of uniformity.
Uniformity is likely to come, if at all, from three sources: Commis-
sioner acquiescence, congressional action, or a Supreme Court decision. It
is doubtful that the Commissioner will acquiesce since he has ample court
authority supporting his view, i.e., Motorlease 21 and Fribourg Nay. Co. 2 2
Nor is Congress likely to act since sections 1245 and 1250 of the Internal
Revenue Code were drawn with all the evidence of the problem at hand,
yet both sections according to the committee reports 23 expressly do not
15 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-1(b) (1964), which requires a clear and convincing
basis for any such redetermination.
16 Rev. Rul. 62-92, 1962-1 Cum. Bull. 29:
The depreciation deduction for the taxable year of disposition of an asset
used in the trade or business or in the production of income, otherwise
properly allowable under the taxpayer's method of accounting for depreciation,
is limited to the amount, if any, by which the adjusted basis of the asset at
the beginning of the year exceeds the amount realized from sale or exchange.
17 Rev. Rul. 53-90, 1953-1 Cum. Bull. 43.
'5 Rev. Rul. 62-92, 1962-1 Cum. Bull. 29.
19 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-1(a) (1964).
20 See Horvitz, "Although CA-2 upholds IRS on year-of-sale depreciation, Cohn
rule may help taxpayers," 21 J. Taxation 203 (1964); Merritt, "Government briefs in
Cohn refute IRS disallowance of year-of-sale depreciation," 20 J. Taxation 156 (1964).
21 Supra note 3.
22 Ibid.
23 S. Rep. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 133 (1964).
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alter the depreciation disallowance ground rules. The answer, it seems, will
have to come from the Supreme Court.
The case today is probably a moot question on the basis of the recent
recapture sections of the Code. Section 1245 provides in part that post-1961
depreciation allowed shall be included as ordinary income, to the extent
that proceeds from the sale or exchange of the asset exceed the adjusted
basis of the asset, if sold in 1963 or later. The section does operate uni-
formly, and should serve to reduce controversies, however it does not effect
depreciation determinations before its effective date.
Thus the context of such controversies will in the future involve
pre-1962 deductions taken for depreciation of 1245 property or gain to
the extent it exceeds post-1961 depreciation. It is to be hoped that the
Supreme Court will place the burden upon the government to demonstrate
the propriety of "back-door" recapture. Under the present policy of the
Service, as exemplified in Revenue Ruling 62-92 and the argument in the
instant case, some taxpayers are disallowed eleven months depreciation,
others a few days in January. This is far from fair treatment. The better
rule would be to indulge in a presumption that gains on such sales repre-
sent accretions in market value, and therefore to be disturbed only upon
proof of a miscalculation in the first instance or by a showing of clear and
convincing evidence. Such hindsight evidence of mere market value should
be presumed insufficient.
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